Abstract-In this paper, we propose a BitTorrent-like protocol that replaces the peer selection mechanisms in the regular BitTorrent protocol with a novel reinforcement learning based mechanism. The inherent operation of P2P systems, which involves repeated interactions among peers over a long time period, allows peers to efficiently identify free-riders as well as desirable collaborators by learning the behavior of their associated peers. Thus, it can help peers improve their download rates and discourage free-riding (FR), while improving fairness. We model the peers' interactions in the BitTorrent-like network as a repeated interaction game, where we explicitly consider the strategic behavior of the peers. A peer that applies the reinforcement learning based mechanism uses a partial history of the observations on associated peers' statistical reciprocal behaviors to determine its best responses and estimate the corresponding impact on its expected utility. The policy determines the peer's resource reciprocations with other peers, which would maximize the peer's long-term performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) content sharing protocols dominate the traffic on the Internet, and thus, have become an important part in building scalable Internet applications [1] .
In P2P content distribution systems, fairness among peers is an important factor, because it encourages peers to actively collaborate in disseminating content, thereby improving system performance. However, even BitTorrent (BT) [2] , one of the most popular P2P protocols, does not provide fair resource reciprocation, particularly for node populations having heterogeneous upload bandwidth [3] - [5] . This is because the tit-for-tat strategy implemented in BT only exploits a shortterm history for making upload decisions. More specifically, upload decisions are made based on the most recent observations of the resource reciprocation. This also implies that the upload decisions are backward-looking and not forwardlooking. Thus, a peer can keep following the tit-for-tat policy only if it continuously uploads pieces of a particular file to its associated peers and as long as it receives pieces of interest in return. However, this is not always feasible, since irrespective of peers' willingness to cooperate, they may not always have pieces that are of interest to the other peers [6] . Yet, such behavior is still perceived as a lack of cooperation for interacting peers. Moreover, it has been shown that BT systems do not effectively cope with peers' non-cooperative behaviors such as free-riding (FR) [7] - [9] , because of their optimistic unchoke mechanism.
In this paper, we model the peers' interactions in the BTlike network as a repeated interaction game -repeated interactions (i.e., reciprocating resources) among several players (i.e., peers) in which a player takes actions (i.e. unchoke/choke peers) so as to maximize its long-term reward (i.e., cumulative download rates) [10] . The underlying state of the environment changes stochastically, and is contingent upon the decisions of the players. In our model, peers can adopt the reinforcement learning (RL) [11] algorithm to make their upload decisions. The peers in the network have partial information history about the reciprocation behaviors of their associated peers. Based on this information, the peers applying the RL-based strategy can estimate their future expected rewards, and then, can determine their best responses accordingly. The RL algorithm allows peers to improve their peer selection strategies based solely on the knowledge of their past interactions. It enables each peer to forecast the impact of the current peer selection on the future expected utility which it tries to maximize.
The proposed protocol can replace the optimistic unchoke, which is the most vulnerable process that allows free-riders [7] , [9] , with the RL-based unchokes. This improves the system performance. Moreover, the BT systems relying on short-term history may suffer from the lack of fairness, as pointed out in e.g., [3] , [4] , [12] . The proposed approach, however, can also improve the fairness by using a strategy based on a long-term history. As discussed in [13] , there is a fundamental tradeoff between performance and fairness in BT-like protocols. We study the tradeoff in the proposed approach and show that the RL-based strategy improves the fairness of the system while penalizing the low-capacity leechers by reducing their download rates. By providing better incentives, the proposed approach can encourage peers to contribute more resources. The importance of contribution incentives in P2P systems is widely studied and different alternatives are proposed (see e.g., [3] , [14] ). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the RL-based strategy that can replace the existing mechanisms deployed in BT protocol, while maximizing longterm utility of participating leechers.
The proposed protocol is implemented on top of an actual BT client, and has been evaluated through extensive experiments in a controlled Planetlab testbed. The RL-based mechanism is executed simply through policy modifications to existing clients with no changes to the BT protocol. Our protocol does not demand full or sparse adoption of the RLbased peer selection mechanism (as in [3] ) and can be run 978-1-4244-9921-2/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEEby any number of peers. Based on the experimental results, several advantages of the proposed protocol against the regular BT protocol are summarized as: i) it discourages FR by limiting the upload to non-cooperative peers, ii) it promotes cooperative resource reciprocation among high-capacity peers, iii) it improves fairness by increasing (decreasing) download rates to the peers that contribute more (fewer) resources, iv) it improves the system robustness by minimizing the impact of FR on the contributing peers' performance, and v) it improves the stability of the peer selection mechanism, which affects directly the performance of the system.
II. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR RESOURCE
RECIPROCATION IN P2P NETWORKS Peers in BT-like systems often make repeated decisions to select unchoked peers given their dynamically changing environment. The evolution of the peers' interactions across the various rechoke periods is modeled as a repeated interaction game [10] .
In each rechoke period, every peer chooses its optimal action given the state it is in, which is represented by the set of resources received from its associated peers. The peers choose their own actions independently and simultaneously. After that, the peers are rewarded (i.e., total download rates) for taking their actions and transit into the next states. The reward and the state transition depend on the other peers' states and actions. During the repeated interactions of multiple peers, the peers can only observe a partial history of their associated peers' reciprocation behaviors. Based on these observations, the peers can estimate their future expected rewards and can identify their best responses (or best actions).
We adopt the RL to estimate the future peer's expected reward, as it leads to improving the peer selection strategy using only knowledge of the peer's own past reciprocation. Formally, an RL environment can be represented by a tuple, ⟨I, , , , ⟩. I is a set of peers in the game, I = {1, . . . , } for peers in the game. is the set of state profiles of all peers in the game, i.e., = S 1 ×⋅ ⋅ ⋅×S , where S is the state space of peer . is the joint action space = A 1 ×⋅ ⋅ ⋅×A , where A is the action (peer selection) space for peer .
: × × → [0, 1] is a state transition probability function that maps from state profile ( ) ∈ at time into the next state profile ( +1) ∈ at time +1 given corresponding joint actions ( ) ∈ . Note that here is discrete and measured in time slots. Finally, : × → ℝ + is a reward vector function defined as a mapping from the state profile ( ) ∈ at time , and corresponding joint actions ( ) ∈ , to a vector with each element being the reward to a particular peer.
To find the optimal policy in the game peers may require the entire history of the interactions among peers in the networks. However, this may be infeasible for real P2P networks. Unlike such games, finding an RL-based policy only requires the peers' own histories of observations through their experiences. The history of observations in the network up to time ( − 1) is defined as
which summarizes all previous states, actions and rewards of the peers in the network up to ( − 1). A peer can only access a portion of the history of observations H( ), which is expressed as O ( )(⊆ H( )). The current state S ( ) is always observable, i.e., S ( ) ∈ O ( ). The state transition probability is calculated from O ( ). This implies that the state transition probability considers long-term history of observations, which enables peers to capture their associated peers' behavior.
1) State Space of Peer -S :
The state of peer represents the set of resources received from the peers in , where denotes the set of peers associating with peer . Thus, it may represent the uploading behavior of its associated peers, or equivalently, it can capture peer 's download rates from its associated peers. The upload rates from peer ∈ to peer at time are denoted by ( ). In the proposed protocol, an uploading behavior of peer observed by peer is described by , and defined as ∈ {0, 1}, where = 1 if > and = 0 otherwise. is a pre-determined threshold of peer . The state space of peer can be expressed as
where denotes the number of peer 's associated peers in , i.e., | | = . Therefore, a state S ( ) ∈ S can capture the uploading behavior of the associated peers at time .
2) Action Space of Peer -A : The action of peer represents the set of its peer selection decisions. The action of peer to peer at time is denoted by , and is defined as ( ) = {0, 1}, where = 0 if peer chokes peer and = 1 otherwise. The action space of peer can thus be expressed as
Hence, an action A ( ) ∈ A is of vector that consists of peer 's peer selection decisions to its associated peers at time .
In the proposed protocol, we assume that peer is able to unchoke (≤ ) peers, and the bandwidth allocated to an unchoked peer by peer at time is determined by ( ) = / , where is peer 's maximum upload bandwidth 1 .
3) State Transition Probability of Peer :
A state transition probability represents the probability that an action A ( ) ∈ A of peer in state S ( ) ∈ S at time will lead to another state S ( + 1) ∈ S at time + 1. This can be expressed as
A peer can estimate the state transition probability functions based on its history interactions of S ( ′ ), A ( ′ ) and S ( ′ +1) for ′ < , which can be stored in a transition table.
4) The Reward of Peer -
: The peer's reward in a state is the sum of the estimated download rates from all of its associated peers. More specifically, a reward of peer from state S ( ) ∈ S can be expressed as
1 While peer allocates the same amount of upload bandwidths to all unchoked peers, the variable case can be future explored. (Fig. 3) Decision Process (Fig. 4) where ⟨X, Y⟩ denotes the inner-product between two vectors of X and Y.
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5) RL-based Policy :
The policy obtained from the RL can provide a specific action A ( ) for peer in state S ( ) at time , i.e., : → . Thus, A ( ) = (S ( )). The actions are determined such that they maximize the cumulative discounted expected reward, defined for a peer in state S ( ) at time = given a discount factor as
Thus, the policy maps each state S ( ) ∈ S into an action, i.e., A ( ) = (S ( )), such that each action maximizes (S ( )). The policy can be deployed as a peer selection algorithm, to enable peers to maximize their long-term utility.
III. THE PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we describe the proposed protocol design, which is summarized in Fig. 1 . The protocol consists of three main processes running in parallel: the learning process, the policy finding process, and the decision process.
A. The Learning Process
The learning process provides updated information about statistical behaviors of the associated peers' resource reciprocation O ( ). This process is necessary since the peers' reciprocation behaviors are not foretold. Therefore, peers are required to act in the environment in order to gather observation. In our proposed protocol, a peer adopting RL-based policy learns its environment statistically (i.e., the changes of states, rewards, etc., and the corresponding state transition probability) using the past observation it made about its associated peers. Thus, each peer needs to update the above information regularly through the learning process, while downloading content from its associated peers. The learning process consists of the following main methods (see Fig. 2.) 1) Computing Reward Method: The reward of peer represents its total download rates from its associated peers estimated by peer . In the reward calculation method, the associated peers are classified into two types -peers with and without reciprocation history based on the available information about their resource reciprocation history.
If peer has a reciprocation history of peer , it estimates the upload rates of peer ∈ based on the weighted average of the recent upload rate samples , i.e.,
where is the weight for most recent resource reciprocation. If peer does not have a reciprocation history of peer , it initializes the information about peer by optimistically estimating that peer reciprocates its resources with high probability and high upload rate. This enables peer to efficiently discover additional peers and bootstrap newly joining peers, which is important for the system efficiency. Whenever peer uploads to a peer without resource reciprocation history and the peer does not upload to in return, peer reduces the peer's presumed upload rate, as this provides with more confidence that the particular peer may not actively reciprocate its data. This also prevents the associated peers from taking advantage of a peer through optimistic initialization and possible FR. Note that white-washing [15] is not possible in our design either, since peers are identified by their IP addresses.
2) Finding State Transition Probability Method : Each peer can capture the time-varying resource reciprocation behaviors of its associated peers by updating the state transition probabilities in every rechoke period. Every rechoke period at ( + 1), peer stores 3-bit triplets for its associated peer , ( ( ), ( ), ( + 1)). In our design, we assume that the state transition of each peer is independent. Thus, the state transition probability A ( ) (S ( ),
) given an action A ( ) = ( 1 ( ), . . . , ( )) can be expressed as
B. The Policy Finding Process
The policy finding process computes the policy using RL. It runs in parallel with the learning process, while using the information obtained by the learning process. This process needs to be running during the entire downloading process as the changes of peers' reciprocation behaviors can result in the policies obtained in the previous time slots being outdated. This process is depicted in Fig. 3 .
For practical implementation, it is critical to reduce the number of peers that a peer considers for reciprocation, as this process may require high computational complexity when the number of associated peers becomes large. Thus, this process begins with reducing the set of associated peers, and then, finds the policy that maximizes the cumulative discounted expected reward in (5) in the reduced peer set. In order to reduce the peer set, peer only selects the peers that can reciprocate their resources with higher probability and with higher upload rate. Hence, peer computes the expected rewardsˆfrom each peer ∈ , defined aŝ
where Pr( ⇝ ) denotes the probability of resource reciprocation with peer . Then, peer reduces its associated peer set by iteratively eliminating the peers with the smallestˆin its associated peer set. More details about the algorithm can be found in [16] .
C. The Decision Process
The decision process determines the peer selection decisions based on the policy and the current state. It includes the initialization phase and the RL phase, shown in Fig. 4 . 
1) Initialization Phase:
Since no information about associated peers is available for a newly joining peer , peer begins with adopting the regular BT mechanisms in the initialization phase. This enables peer to collect reciprocation information with respect to its associated peers. During this phase, peer discovers new peers, i.e., downloads from peers for the first time. Once 's peer discovery is slowed down (for more details, see [16] ), it replaces the regular BT peer selection mechanisms, and operates in the RL phase.
2) RL Phase: In this phase, peer determines the decisions on peer selection based on the policy obtained from the policy finding process in every rechoke period. Peer determines its current state S and the corresponding action A (choke or unchoke), based on the policy , i.e., A = (S ).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We perform extensive experiments on a controlled testbed, in order to evaluate the properties of the proposed protocol. We execute all the experiments consecutively in time on the same set of nodes. Unless otherwise specified, the default implementations of leecher and seed in regular BT systems are deployed. The upload capacities of the nodes are artificially set according to the bandwidth distribution of typical BT leechers [3] . All peers begin the download process simultaneously, which emulates a flash crowd scenario. The initial seeds have stayed connected through out the entire experiment. To provide synthetic churn with constant capacity, leechers disconnect immediately after completion of downloading the entire video file, and reconnect as new comers immediately while requesting the entire video file again. Unless otherwise specified, the experiments host 104 Planetlab nodes, 100 leechers and 4 seeds with a combined capacity of 128 KB/s, serving a 99 MB video file.
We implemented an RL-based client on top of the Enhanced CTorrent client, version 3.2 [17] . Our client can operate either in RL-enhanced mode using RL-based mechanisms, or in regular mode using the regular BT peer selection mechanism, for resource reciprocation. While only the main results of our experiments are highlighted in this paper due to the page limit, more details of the implementation such as the protocol prototype, design parameters, etc. and more extensive experiment results from various scenarios can be found in [16] .
A. Single Leecher Adopting RL-enhanced Protocol
In this experiment, a single leecher adopts the RL-enhanced protocol, while the rest of the leechers run with the regular BT in a network having no free-rider (this is a common scenario that was tested by other proposed protocols such as [3] , [14] ). Outliers are marked individually with "+" mark. We can observe that leechers having higher and lower capacities benefit from the RLenhanced with 12%-27% improvement of their download time as indicated by the median value. This improvement provides leechers with an incentive to adopt the proposed protocol. By selecting to unchoke peers based on historical behavior information, our proposed protocol avoids the randomization that is presented in the regular BT tit-for-tat and optimistic unchoke implementations, which results in unstable peer selections and slow convergence.
B. RL-Enhanced Network without Free-Riders
We compare a system consisting of all leechers adopting the regular BT protocol with a system consisting of all leechers running in RL-enhanced mode. In this section, the network is without free-riders and 50 leechers are hosted. Fig. 6 shows the download completion time of leechers.
For each group of leechers that has the same upload capacity, separate boxplots are depicted for the different scenarios. The results clearly show the performance difference among high-capacity leechers, which are the fastest 20% leechers, and low-capacity leechers, which are the slowest 80% leechers. High-capacity leechers can significantly improve their download completion time -leechers having the upload capacity of at least 18kB/sec improve their download completion time by up to 33% in median value. Unlike in the regular BT system, where leechers determine their peer selection decisions based on the tit-for-tat (myopic), the RL-enhanced leechers determine their peer selection decisions based on the long term history (foresighted). This enables the leechers to estimate the behaviors of their associated peers more accurately. Unlike regular BT, the random decisions of peer selection are also significantly reduced in the proposed approach, as the random decisions are taken only in the initialization phase or in order to collect the reciprocation history for newly joined peers. As a result, the high-capacity leechers can increase the probability of reciprocating resources with other high-capacity leechers.
This result also shows that fairness is improved in the RL-enhanced network, as high-capacity leechers can increase their download rates while the download rates of low-capacity leechers decrease compared to the regular BT system. Note that, however, all the peers that are slowed down by the RLbased strategy still download faster than their upload rates.
C. RL-Enhanced Network with Free-Riders
In this section, we investigate how effectively the proposed protocol can prevent selfish behaviors such as FRs. Fig. 7 shows the time that the free-riders complete downloading 99MB video file in a network consisting of 50 contributing leechers with several free-riders (i.e., 5, 10, and 15 freeriders). This result confirms that in the RL-enhanced network the leechers are able to effectively penalize the free-riders, as it takes longer time for the free-riders to complete their downloads e.g., 8%-20% more time as measured by the median value, in comparison to the regular BT protocol. This is because the RL-enhanced leechers can efficiently capture the selfish behaviors of the free-riders. Thus, they unchoke the free-riders with a significantly lower probability. Alternative set of simulation results in [16] shows that the leechers in the regular BT network upload approximately 2.8-3.7 times more data to the free-riders compared to the RL-enhanced network. Therefore, we can conclude that the RL-enhanced networks are more robust to the selfish behaviors of peers than the networks operating with the regular BT protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose a BT-like protocol that can replace the peer selection mechanisms of the regular BT protocol with a novel RL-based mechanism. The resource reciprocations among peers are modeled as repeated interactions in a game. Using RL, peers can estimate the impact of associated peers' reciprocation behaviors on the expected future reward and can improve their reciprocation strategies. Experiment results based on our actual implementation show that the proposed protocol improves the stability of the peer selection mechanism, improves collaboration among high capacity peers, improves fairness, enhances the robustness of the network against non-cooperative behaviors such as FR, and improves the download rates of the peers deploying the protocol.
